Index: Makefile.in
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/Makefile.in,v
retrieving revision 1.273
diff -u -r1.273 Makefile.in
--- Makefile.in 29 May 2005 07:22:29 -0000 1.273
+++ Makefile.in 26 Sep 2005 21:41:47 -0000
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
- entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o
+ entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o kexgssc.o
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@
auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
auth-krb5.o \
- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
audit.o audit-bsm.o
Index: acconfig.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/Attic/acconfig.h,v
retrieving revision 1.183
diff -u -r1.183 acconfig.h
--- acconfig.h 7 Jul 2005 10:33:36 -0000 1.183
+++ acconfig.h 26 Sep 2005 21:41:47 -0000
@@ -347,6 +347,12 @@
/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */
#undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO
+/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
+#undef USE_CCAPI
+
+/* platform has a Security Authorization Session API */
+#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+
/* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
#undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX
Index: auth-krb5.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v
retrieving revision 1.28
diff -u -r1.28 auth-krb5.c
--- auth-krb5.c 7 Jul 2005 10:33:36 -0000 1.28
+++ auth-krb5.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:47 -0000
@@ -159,8 +159,13 @@
len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#else
snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
@@ -212,15 +217,22 @@
#ifndef HEIMDAL
krb5_error_code
ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
- int tmpfd, ret;
+ int ret;
char ccname[40];
mode_t old_umask;
+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
+#else
+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
+ int tmpfd;
+#endif
ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
- if (ret == -1 || ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+ cctemplate, geteuid());
+ if (ret == -1 || ret >= (int) sizeof(ccname))
return ENOMEM;
+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
old_umask = umask(0177);
tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
umask(old_umask);
@@ -235,6 +247,7 @@
return errno;
}
close(tmpfd);
+#endif
return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
}
Index: auth.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth.h,v
retrieving revision 1.68
diff -u -r1.68 auth.h
--- auth.h 7 Jul 2005 01:50:20 -0000 1.68
+++ auth.h 26 Sep 2005 21:41:47 -0000
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */
int attempt;
int failures;
+ int server_caused_failure;
int force_pwchange;
char *user; /* username sent by the client */
char *service;
Index: auth2-gss.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth2-gss.c,v
retrieving revision 1.11
diff -u -r1.11 auth2-gss.c
--- auth2-gss.c 17 Jul 2005 07:22:45 -0000 1.11
+++ auth2-gss.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:47 -0000
@@ -47,6 +47,39 @@
static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+/*
+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
+ */
+static int
+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ Buffer b;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ u_int len;
+
+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+ mic.length = len;
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+ "gssapi-keyex");
+
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ xfree(mic.value);
+
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
/*
* We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
* how to check local user kuserok and the like
@@ -97,11 +130,13 @@
if (!present) {
xfree(doid);
+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
return (0);
}
if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
xfree(doid);
+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
return (0);
}
@@ -284,6 +319,12 @@
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
}
+
+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
+ "gssapi-keyex",
+ userauth_gsskeyex,
+ &options.gss_authentication
+};
Authmethod method_gssapi = {
"gssapi-with-mic",
Index: auth2.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth2.c,v
retrieving revision 1.135
diff -u -r1.135 auth2.c
--- auth2.c 17 Jul 2005 07:26:44 -0000 1.135
+++ auth2.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:47 -0000
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
#ifdef GSSAPI
+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
#endif
@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@
&method_none,
&method_pubkey,
#ifdef GSSAPI
+ &method_gsskeyex,
&method_gssapi,
#endif
&method_passwd,
@@ -192,6 +194,7 @@
#endif
authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
/* try to authenticate user */
m = authmethod_lookup(method);
@@ -262,7 +265,9 @@
/* now we can break out */
authctxt->success = 1;
} else {
- if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
+ /* Dont count server configuration issues against the client */
+ if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
+ authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
#endif
Index: configure.ac
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/configure.ac,v
retrieving revision 1.292
diff -u -r1.292 configure.ac
--- configure.ac 31 Aug 2005 16:59:49 -0000 1.292
+++ configure.ac 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -266,6 +266,28 @@
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREUID)
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SETREGID)
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(BIND_8_COMPAT, 1)
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
+ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
+ [cc_context_t c;
+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
+ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI)
+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
+ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
+ fi],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
+ )
;;
*-*-hpux*)
# first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
Index: gss-genr.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/gss-genr.c,v
retrieving revision 1.5
diff -u -r1.5 gss-genr.c
--- gss-genr.c 17 Jul 2005 07:22:45 -0000 1.5
+++ gss-genr.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.4 2005/07/17 07:17:55 djm Exp $ */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2005 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -34,12 +34,152 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "ssh-gss.h"
extern u_char *session_id2;
extern u_int session_id2_len;
+typedef struct {
+ char *encoded;
+ gss_OID oid;
+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
+
+/*
+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
+ */
+
+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
+
+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
+
+int
+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
+ *
+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
+ */
+
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host) {
+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
+ OM_uint32 min_status;
+
+ gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported);
+
+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
+ (void *)host));
+}
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+ void *data) {
+ Buffer buf;
+ int i, oidpos, enclen;
+ char *mechs, *encoded;
+ char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ char deroid[2];
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+
+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
+ for (i=0;gss_enc2oid[i].encoded!=NULL;i++)
+ xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
+ xfree(gss_enc2oid);
+ }
+
+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping)*
+ (gss_supported->count+1));
+
+ buffer_init(&buf);
+
+ oidpos = 0;
+ for (i = 0;i < gss_supported->count;i++) {
+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
+ (*check)(&(gss_supported->elements[i]), data)) {
+
+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
+
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md)*2);
+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md)*2);
+
+ if (oidpos != 0)
+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+
+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)-1);
+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+ buffer_put_char(&buf,',');
+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)-1);
+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+
+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
+ oidpos++;
+ }
+ }
+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
+
+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
+
+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
+ buffer_free(&buf);
+
+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
+ xfree(mechs);
+ mechs = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return (mechs);
+}
+
+gss_OID
+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int *gex) {
+ int i = 0;
+
+ if (strncmp(name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)-1) == 0) {
+ name+=sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)-1;
+ *gex = 0;
+ } else if (strncmp(name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)-1) == 0) {
+ name+=sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)-1;
+ *gex = 1;
+ } else {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) {
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
+
+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
+}
+
/* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
int
ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
@@ -250,6 +390,9 @@
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
@@ -257,6 +400,19 @@
return (ctx->major);
}
+/* Priviledged when used by server */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+
+ return (ctx->major);
+}
+
void
ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
const char *context)
@@ -276,6 +432,21 @@
ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
+}
+
+int
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(gss_OID oid, void *host) {
+ Gssctxt * ctx = NULL;
+ gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, oid);
+ ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, host);
+ major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, NULL);
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token);
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
+ return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
Index: gss-serv.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/gss-serv.c,v
retrieving revision 1.8
diff -u -r1.8 gss-serv.c
--- gss-serv.c 31 Aug 2005 09:46:27 -0000 1.8
+++ gss-serv.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -62,6 +62,28 @@
};
/* Unpriviledged */
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
+ gss_OID_set supported;
+
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
+ NULL));
+}
+
+/* Unpriviledged */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(gss_OID oid, void *data) {
+ Gssctxt * ctx = NULL;
+ int res;
+
+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
+
+ return (res);
+}
+
+/* Unpriviledged */
void
ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
{
@@ -296,16 +318,6 @@
else
debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism");
return (0);
-}
-
-/* Priviledged */
-OM_uint32
-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-{
- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-
- return (ctx->major);
}
#endif
Index: kex.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/kex.c,v
retrieving revision 1.67
diff -u -r1.67 kex.c
--- kex.c 26 Jul 2005 11:54:56 -0000 1.67
+++ kex.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16
/* prototype */
@@ -298,6 +302,14 @@
k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1;
} else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX) == 0) {
k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)-1) == 0) {
+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1;
+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)-1) == 0) {
+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1;
+#endif
} else
fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
}
Index: kex.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/kex.h,v
retrieving revision 1.39
diff -u -r1.39 kex.h
--- kex.h 26 Jul 2005 11:54:56 -0000 1.39
+++ kex.h 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@
KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1,
KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
KEX_MAX
};
@@ -114,6 +116,11 @@
Buffer peer;
int done;
int flags;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ int gss_deleg_creds;
+ int gss_trust_dns;
+ char *gss_host;
+#endif
char *client_version_string;
char *server_version_string;
int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
@@ -135,6 +142,11 @@
void kexdh_server(Kex *);
void kexgex_client(Kex *);
void kexgex_server(Kex *);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+void kexgss_client(Kex *);
+void kexgss_server(Kex *);
+#endif
u_char *
kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
Index: kexgssc.c
===================================================================
RCS file: kexgssc.c
diff -N kexgssc.c
--- /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
+++ kexgssc.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2005 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+void
+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
+ unsigned int klen, kout;
+ DH *dh;
+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
+ unsigned char *kbuf;
+ unsigned char *hash;
+ unsigned char *serverhostkey = NULL;
+ char *msg;
+ char *lang;
+ int type = 0;
+ int first = 1;
+ int slen = 0;
+ int gex = 0;
+ int nbits, min, max;
+ u_int strlen;
+
+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, &gex) == NULL)
+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
+
+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
+
+ if (gex) {
+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
+ min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+ max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
+ packet_put_int(min);
+ packet_put_int(nbits);
+ packet_put_int(max);
+
+ packet_send();
+
+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
+
+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
+
+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
+ } else {
+ dh = dh_new_group1();
+ }
+
+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+
+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
+
+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+
+ do {
+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
+
+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
+ &ret_flags);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+ send_tok.length);
+ }
+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
+ }
+
+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
+ xfree(recv_tok.value);
+
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
+
+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
+ */
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ if (first) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+ send_tok.length);
+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+ first = 0;
+ } else {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
+ send_tok.length);
+ }
+ packet_send();
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+
+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
+ do {
+ type = packet_read();
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
+ if (serverhostkey)
+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
+ serverhostkey =
+ packet_get_string(&slen);
+ }
+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
+
+ /* Is there a token included? */
+ if (packet_get_char()) {
+ recv_tok.value=
+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
+ } else {
+ /* No token included */
+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
+ }
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
+ debug("Received Error");
+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
+ min_status = packet_get_int();
+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%s",msg);
+ default:
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+ type);
+ }
+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
+ } else {
+ /* No data, and not complete */
+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
+ }
+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+ /*
+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
+ */
+
+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
+
+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
+
+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
+ klen = DH_size(dh);
+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
+
+ shared_secret = BN_new();
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf,kout, shared_secret);
+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+ xfree(kbuf);
+
+ if (gex) {
+ hash = kexgex_hash( kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+ serverhostkey, slen,
+ min, nbits, max,
+ dh->p, dh->g,
+ dh->pub_key,
+ dh_server_pub,
+ shared_secret
+ );
+ } else {
+ /* The GSS hash is identical to the DH one */
+ hash = kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+ serverhostkey, slen, /* server host key */
+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
+ shared_secret /* K */
+ );
+ }
+
+ gssbuf.value = hash;
+ gssbuf.length = 20;
+
+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
+
+ xfree(msg_tok.value);
+
+ DH_free(dh);
+ if (serverhostkey)
+ xfree(serverhostkey);
+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+
+ /* save session id */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = 20;
+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+ else
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret);
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ kex_finish(kex);
+}
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
Index: kexgsss.c
===================================================================
RCS file: kexgsss.c
diff -N kexgsss.c
--- /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
+++ kexgsss.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2005 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+void
+kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
+{
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+
+ /*
+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
+ */
+
+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+ unsigned int klen, kout;
+ unsigned char *kbuf, *hash;
+ DH *dh;
+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+ int type = 0;
+ int gex;
+ u_int slen;
+ gss_OID oid;
+
+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
+
+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
+ * into life
+ */
+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
+ ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+
+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, &gex);
+ if (oid == NULL)
+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
+
+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
+
+ if (gex) {
+ debug("Doing group exchange");
+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
+ min = packet_get_int();
+ nbits = packet_get_int();
+ max = packet_get_int();
+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+ packet_check_eom();
+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
+ min, nbits, max);
+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
+ if (dh == NULL)
+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
+ packet_send();
+
+ packet_write_wait();
+
+ } else {
+ dh = dh_new_group1();
+ }
+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
+
+ do {
+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
+ type = packet_read();
+ switch(type) {
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+ recv_tok.length = slen;
+
+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
+
+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
+
+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
+ break;
+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
+ recv_tok.length = slen;
+ break;
+ default:
+ packet_disconnect(
+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
+ type);
+ }
+
+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
+
+ xfree(recv_tok.value);
+
+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
+
+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
+ fatal("No client public key");
+
+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+ packet_send();
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+ }
+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+ packet_send();
+ }
+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
+ }
+
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
+
+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
+
+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
+
+ klen = DH_size(dh);
+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
+
+ shared_secret = BN_new();
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+ xfree(kbuf);
+
+ if (gex) {
+ hash = kexgex_hash(
+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+ NULL, 0,
+ min, nbits, max,
+ dh->p, dh->g,
+ dh_client_pub,
+ dh->pub_key,
+ shared_secret
+ );
+ }
+ else {
+ /* The GSSAPI hash is identical to the Diffie Helman one */
+ hash = kex_dh_hash(
+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret
+ );
+ }
+ BN_free(dh_client_pub);
+
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = 20;
+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ gssbuf.value = hash;
+ gssbuf.length = 20; /* Hashlen appears to always be 20 */
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
+ packet_put_string((char *)msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
+
+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
+ packet_put_string((char *)send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
+ } else {
+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
+ }
+ packet_send();
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
+
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
+ else
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+
+ DH_free(dh);
+
+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, shared_secret);
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ kex_finish(kex);
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
Index: key.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/key.c,v
retrieving revision 1.59
diff -u -r1.59 key.c
--- key.c 17 Jun 2005 02:59:35 -0000 1.59
+++ key.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -650,6 +650,8 @@
return KEY_RSA;
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0) {
return KEY_DSA;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) {
+ return KEY_NULL;
}
debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
return KEY_UNSPEC;
Index: key.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/key.h,v
retrieving revision 1.25
diff -u -r1.25 key.h
--- key.h 17 Nov 2003 10:18:23 -0000 1.25
+++ key.h 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
KEY_RSA1,
KEY_RSA,
KEY_DSA,
+ KEY_NULL,
KEY_UNSPEC
};
enum fp_type {
Index: monitor.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor.c,v
retrieving revision 1.86
diff -u -r1.86 monitor.c
--- monitor.c 17 Jul 2005 07:53:31 -0000 1.86
+++ monitor.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@
int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -209,11 +210,17 @@
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
@@ -318,6 +325,10 @@
/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif
} else {
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
@@ -391,6 +402,10 @@
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif
} else {
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
@@ -1623,6 +1638,10 @@
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+#endif
kex->server = 1;
kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
@@ -1865,6 +1884,7 @@
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
}
return (0);
}
@@ -1915,4 +1935,42 @@
/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
return (authenticated);
}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc data;
+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ u_int len;
+
+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ data.length = len;
+ if (data.length != 20)
+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, data.length);
+
+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+ session_id2_len = data.length;
+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
+ }
+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
+
+ xfree(data.value);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
+
+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
Index: monitor.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor.h,v
retrieving revision 1.20
diff -u -r1.20 monitor.h
--- monitor.h 2 Feb 2005 13:20:53 -0000 1.20
+++ monitor.h 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
Index: monitor_wrap.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor_wrap.c,v
retrieving revision 1.53
diff -u -r1.53 monitor_wrap.c
--- monitor_wrap.c 17 Jul 2005 07:53:31 -0000 1.53
+++ monitor_wrap.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -1216,4 +1216,27 @@
debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ u_int len;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
+
+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
+ hash->length = len;
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return(major);
+}
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
Index: monitor_wrap.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor_wrap.h,v
retrieving revision 1.21
diff -u -r1.21 monitor_wrap.h
--- monitor_wrap.h 8 Feb 2005 10:52:48 -0000 1.21
+++ monitor_wrap.h 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
Index: readconf.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/readconf.c,v
retrieving revision 1.118
diff -u -r1.118 readconf.c
--- readconf.c 12 Aug 2005 12:11:18 -0000 1.118
+++ readconf.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@
oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+ oGssTrustDns,
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
oDeprecated, oUnsupported
@@ -140,9 +141,11 @@
#if defined(GSSAPI)
{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
#endif
{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
@@ -410,6 +413,10 @@
intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
goto parse_flag;
+ case oGssTrustDns:
+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case oBatchMode:
intptr = &options->batch_mode;
goto parse_flag;
@@ -917,6 +924,7 @@
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->gss_authentication = -1;
options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
@@ -1000,6 +1008,8 @@
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
Index: readconf.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/readconf.h,v
retrieving revision 1.59
diff -u -r1.59 readconf.h
--- readconf.h 16 Jun 2005 03:19:42 -0000 1.59
+++ readconf.h 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
int password_authentication; /* Try password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
Index: servconf.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/servconf.c,v
retrieving revision 1.134
diff -u -r1.134 servconf.c
--- servconf.c 12 Aug 2005 12:11:37 -0000 1.134
+++ servconf.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
options->gss_authentication=-1;
+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
@@ -186,6 +187,8 @@
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
@@ -270,7 +273,7 @@
sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv,
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssKeyEx, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv,
sUsePrivilegeSeparation,
sDeprecated, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
@@ -324,9 +327,11 @@
{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported },
#ifdef GSSAPI
{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported },
#endif
{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication },
@@ -667,6 +672,10 @@
case sGssAuthentication:
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sGssKeyEx:
+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssCleanupCreds:
Index: servconf.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/servconf.h,v
retrieving revision 1.63
diff -u -r1.63 servconf.h
--- servconf.h 19 Jan 2005 23:57:56 -0000 1.63
+++ servconf.h 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@
int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
* authenticated with Kerberos. */
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
* authentication. */
Index: ssh-gss.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/ssh-gss.h,v
retrieving revision 1.7
diff -u -r1.7 ssh-gss.h
--- ssh-gss.h 22 Jun 2004 02:56:02 -0000 1.7
+++ ssh-gss.h 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -62,6 +62,16 @@
#define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
+
typedef struct {
char *filename;
char *envvar;
@@ -99,6 +109,7 @@
} Gssctxt;
extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
@@ -121,13 +132,20 @@
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
-/* In the server */
+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(gss_OID, void *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host);
+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, void *);
+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(gss_OID, void *);
+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int *);
+
+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(gss_OID, void *);
int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-
+char * ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
Index: ssh_config.5
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/ssh_config.5,v
retrieving revision 1.61
diff -u -r1.61 ssh_config.5
--- ssh_config.5 14 Jul 2005 07:06:51 -0000 1.61
+++ ssh_config.5 26 Sep 2005 21:41:48 -0000
@@ -447,6 +447,16 @@
The default is
.Dq no .
Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
+Set to
+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
+the name of the host being connected to. If
+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI
+key exchange.
.It Cm HashKnownHosts
Indicates that
.Nm ssh
Index: sshconnect2.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshconnect2.c,v
retrieving revision 1.131
diff -u -r1.131 sshconnect2.c
--- sshconnect2.c 31 Aug 2005 09:46:27 -0000 1.131
+++ sshconnect2.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:49 -0000
@@ -84,9 +84,34 @@
{
Kex *kex;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ char *orig, *gss;
+ int len;
+ char *gss_host;
+#endif
+
xxx_host = host;
xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this client to
+ * the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
+ else
+ gss_host = host;
+
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host);
+ if (gss) {
+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ len = strlen(orig) + strlen(gss) + 2;
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = xmalloc(len);
+ snprintf(myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], len, "%s,%s", gss,
+ orig);
+ }
+#endif
+
if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
options.ciphers = NULL;
@@ -114,6 +139,18 @@
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+ if (gss) {
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+ len = strlen(orig) + sizeof(",null");
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = xmalloc(len);
+ snprintf(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], len,
+ "%s,null", orig);
+ }
+#endif
+
if (options.rekey_limit)
packet_set_rekey_limit(options.rekey_limit);
@@ -122,10 +159,20 @@
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
+#endif
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
+#endif
+
xxx_kex = kex;
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
@@ -208,6 +255,7 @@
void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
#endif
void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
@@ -223,6 +271,10 @@
Authmethod authmethods[] = {
#ifdef GSSAPI
+ {"gssapi-keyex",
+ userauth_gsskeyex,
+ &options.gss_authentication,
+ NULL},
{"gssapi-with-mic",
userauth_gssapi,
&options.gss_authentication,
@@ -706,6 +758,48 @@
xfree(msg);
xfree(lang);
}
+
+int
+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 ms;
+
+ static int attempt = 0;
+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
+ return (0);
+
+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
+ "gssapi-keyex");
+
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
+ packet_send();
+
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
#endif /* GSSAPI */
int
Index: sshd.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshd.c,v
retrieving revision 1.313
diff -u -r1.313 sshd.c
--- sshd.c 26 Jul 2005 11:54:56 -0000 1.313
+++ sshd.c 26 Sep 2005 21:41:49 -0000
@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
+#endif
+
#ifdef LIBWRAP
#include <tcpd.h>
#include <syslog.h>
@@ -1117,10 +1121,13 @@
logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
}
+#ifndef GSSAPI
+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
}
+#endif
if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
exit(1);
@@ -1663,6 +1670,60 @@
/* Log the connection. */
verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
+ /*
+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
+ *
+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
+ * same session (bad).
+ *
+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
+ * automatically.
+ *
+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
+ */
+ {
+ OSStatus err = 0;
+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
+
+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
+ if (err)
+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
+ (unsigned) err);
+ else
+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
+
+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
+ else {
+ debug("Creating new security session...");
+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
+ if (err)
+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
+ (unsigned) err);
+
+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
+ &sattrs);
+ if (err)
+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
+ (unsigned) err);
+ else
+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
/*
* We don\'t want to listen forever unless the other side
* successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
@@ -2006,13 +2069,63 @@
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
/* start key exchange */
- kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ {
+ char *orig;
+ char *gss = NULL;
+ char *newstr = NULL;
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+
+ /*
+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
+ * the other key exchange algorithms
+ */
+
+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+ orig = NULL;
+
+ if (options.gss_keyex)
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+ else
+ gss = NULL;
+
+ if (gss && orig) {
+ int len = strlen(orig) + strlen(gss) + 2;
+ newstr = xmalloc(len);
+ snprintf(newstr, len, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+ } else if (gss) {
+ newstr = gss;
+ } else if (orig) {
+ newstr = orig;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
+ * host key algorithm we support
+ */
+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
+
+ if (newstr)
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
+ else
+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* start key exchange */
+ kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+#endif
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
Index: sshd_config.5
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshd_config.5,v
retrieving revision 1.49
diff -u -r1.49 sshd_config.5
--- sshd_config.5 26 Jul 2005 11:54:57 -0000 1.49
+++ sshd_config.5 26 Sep 2005 21:41:49 -0000
@@ -277,6 +277,12 @@
The default is
.Dq no .
Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
.It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
on logout.
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